Abstract. Whenever agents deal with condential information, it is important that they comply with a principled security policy. W e show h o w the database concept of multi-level security can be applied to inter-agent communication. This includes the case where an unauthorized agent i s misinformed on purpose in order to protect condential information.
Introduction
In certain applications, it is essential to protect condential information from unauthorized access. While access restrictions in relational databases have to be dened within the database schema, implying that only entire tables (i.e. predicates) can be protected, the concept of multi-level security (MLS) 1 allows to protect single rows of a table (i.e. atomic sentences) according to their security classication. The MLS concept is not concerned with lower-level security issues such as authentication, or secure message transport protocols, but only with the denition of secure query answering and secure update in information systems.
We show h o w m ulti-level security can be achieved in multi-agent and multidatabase systems. This requires that the security restrictions dened in MLS tables have to be taken into consideration in inter-agent communication. We formalize multi-level security on the basis of our theory of vivid knowledge and agent systems introduced in [Wag95, W ag96] .
A vivid agent is a software-controlled system whose state is represented by a knowledge base, and whose behavior is represented by means of action and reaction rules. The basic functionality of a vivid agent comprises a knowledge system (including an update and an inference operation), and the capability t o represent and perform actions in order to be able to generate and execute plans. Since a vivid agent is`situated' in an environment with which it has to be able to communicate, it also needs the ability to react in response to perception events, and in response to communication events created by the communication acts of other agents. Reactions may be immediate and independent from the current believe state of the agent but they may also depend on the result of deliberation. In any case, they are triggered by e v ents which are not controlled by the agent.
We do not assume a xed formal language and a xed logical system for the knowledge base of an agent. Rather, we believe that it is more appropriate to choose a suitable knowledge system for each agent individually according to its domain and its tasks. In simple cases, a relational database-like system (admitting of atomic sentences only) will do the job, while in more involved cases one may need the ability to process, in addition to simple facts, uncertain, temporal or condential information, or even such advanced capabilities as deductive query answering and abductive reasoning.
While certain agents may have rather limited capabilities, others are quite complex. We call the simplest form of a vivid agent a r e agent. A reagent d o e s not have explicit goals and intentions but only beliefs about the current state of aairs. It reacts to events in its environment, taking into account what it currently believes. A reagent updates its beliefs and draws inferences from them for answering queries by applying the respective operations of the vivid knowledge system it is based on.
A cooperative knowledge base can be viewed as a reagent, since cooperative query answering can be achieved on the basis of reactive communication protocols dened at design time (without planning for user-dened tasks communicated at run time). A multidatabase (MDB) system, involving inhomogeneous nodes with a global distribution schema, can therefore be conceptualized as a multi-reagent system. Notice that if there were only relational databases in a MDB, there would be no communication, since the semantics of RDBs assumes their completeness, i.e. a standard RDB has never any reason to ask another database for additional information. Communication between databases requires incomplete knowledge.
Vivid Knowledge Systems
The knowledge system of a vivid agent is based on three specic languages: L KB is the set of all admissible knowledge bases, L Query is the query language, and L Input is the set of all admissible inputs, i. 
MLS Databases
In multi-level secure (MLS) databases, 3 all information items are assigned a security classication, and all database users are assigned a security clearance, both from a partially ordered set of security levels. For instance, the four security levels unclassied (0), condential (1), secret (2), and top secret (3) may be used to classify entries in a MLS table.
As an example, consider the database of a hospital. Depending on the respective person it may be sensitive information to know whether someone is a patient in the hospital. In the case of a politician, such infomation would be publicly available. But not so in the case of a shy pop star, or a secret service agent. The basic principle underlying MLS query answering is called simple security property and was dened in the Bell-LaPadula model of mandatory security, see [Lan81] . It can also be described by the slogan \no read up", i.e. users are only permitted to read from a level dominated by their own. We will formalize this principle below in the denition of secure inference. As opposed to [SWQ94] , we think that it should be dened by the logical semantics of MLS databases how lower-level beliefs carry over to higher-level beliefs. Notice that it is not possible to preserve privacy and maintain security by simply omitting information, like in the reply`no answer' to the question`Is Michael Jackson a patient in this hospital ?'. The asking reporter could easily infer from this refusal to answer that MJ must be a patient in the hospital. The only way to maintain security i s t o g i v e a wrong answer, i.e. to misinform the unauthorized asker. The rationality principle of secure inference is the (Principle of Minimal Misinformation) Askers are only misinformed about an information item if they are not suciently authorized with respect to that item.
Assume, for instance, that Boris Yeltsin is in the hospital with an accute alcoholism. When a reporter asks if BY is in the hospital, he receives the answer yes. If he then asks whether BY has drunk too much, the secure answer may b e no or unknown. 4 When being asked what BY suers from, the hospital information system may reply to the reporter that he has a severe inuenca (i.e. a cover story). In our examples, we will only use the security hierarchy f0; 1; 2; 3g introduced above. Table) It may be useful to be able to ask questions relative to others' viewpoints. For example, the nurse (with clearance level 1) might need to ask,`If a reporter (with clearance level 0) asks for a list of the current patients, what will be the answer ?' She would put this as the query:
Denition 4 (MLS
There is no need to allow for nested B operators.
Denition 6 (Secure Inference) Let X be a MLS database, ; 2 S H, l2Lit, F;G2L(:;^;_;9;8;B ), and H 2 L 0 (:;^; _; 9; 8). In formalizing secure update, we do not follow the Bell-LaPadula model which requires a \no write down" policy (also called`-property') where users are only permitted to write to a level that dominates their own. This principle is supposed to prevent users from passing information directly downward through the security hierarchy. It makes only sense, however, in an intelligence context where a highly authorized user may be spy. In a security policy for normal organizations without particular intelligence concerns it seems more reasonable to assume that users in the higher level of the hierarchy can be trusted not to disclose sensitive information to lower levels. This also corresponds more closely to management practice. We will therefore assume the principle of \no write up" preventing users to overwrite information at levels above their own while permitting them to update lower level information either seriously or for the purpose of misinformation.
Inputs to MLS databases are annotated by the clearance level of the information supplier.
Denition 7 (Secure Update) Let a be an atom, and l a literal. has to be protected, say at clearance level 3 (top secret), this cannot be achieved by means of simple MLS tables which w ould have to record negative e n tries in addition to positve ones. This is possible, however, in MLS bitables which are dened in [Wag97] .
Specication and Execution of Reagents
Simple vivid agents whose mental state comprises only beliefs, and whose behavior is purely reactive, i.e. not based on any form of planning and plan execution, Reaction rules are triggered by events. The agent interpreter continuously checks the event queue of the agent. If there is a new event message, it is matched with the event condition of all reaction rules, and the epistemic conditions of those rules matching the event are evaluated. If they are satisable in the current knowledge base, all free variables in the rules are instantiated accordingly resulting in a set of triggered actions with associated epistemic eects. All these actions are then executed, leading to physical actions and to sending messages to other agents, and their epistemic eects are assimilated into the current knowledge base.
Dening the Execution of Reagents
The perception-reaction-cycle in the execution of reagents consists of the following steps: repeat 1. Get the next message from the event queue, and check whether it triggers any reaction rules. If it does not, then repeat 1, else continue. 2. For each of the triggered reaction rules, assimilate the epistemic eect of the triggered action into the knowledge base, and if it is 1) a physical action, execute it by calling the associated procedure.
2) a communicative action, execute it by sending the corresponding message to the specied addressee. The following cycle procedure is a Prolog-style meta-logic specication of the reagent execution model. When an agent sends a message, it directs that message to a specic addressee.
When an agent receives a message, it knows the sender of that message. The order of messages in point-to-point communication is preserved. No message gets lost. { Message types are dened by a communication event language based on speech act theory.
{ The arguments of a message (i.e. the`propositional content' of the corresponding communication act) may aect the mental state of both the sender and the receiver.
Communication in multiagent systems should be based on the speech act theory of Austin and Searle [Aus62, Sea69] , an informal theory within analytical philosophy of language. The essential insight o f s p e e c h act theory was that an utterance by a s p e a k er is, in general, not the mere statement of a true or false sentence, but rather an action of a specic kind (such as an assertion, a request, a promise, etc.). Therefore, logic alone is not sucient for a semantic account o f v erbal communication.
In our model of agents, the semantics of communicative actions is rather determined by 1. a mentalistic model of agents, dening their mental state, together with a notion of mental conditions and mental eects of actions, 2. a satisfaction relation between mental states and mental conditions, 3. an operation that assimilates mental eects into a mental state, 4. the assignment of a mental precondition and a mental eect to each action, and 5. associating with each type of communicative action a type of reaction (of the addressee of a communication act).
In this paper, we use the simple model of reagents, where the mental state consists only of beliefs (represented in a KB), the mental satisfaction relation and the mental assimilate operation are`and Upd, and communicative actions are represented by means of reaction rules. We use a functional predicate agent( Agent, Clearance), for recording the clearance levels of all agents known to an agent. Agents without an entry in this table will be assigned clearance level 0 (unclassied) by default.
The following denition of secure communication is based on the assumption that all agents involved in the communication are believed to be truthful and competent by their fellow agents, implying that they normally provide correct information. The basic inter-agent communication functionality consists of three types of communication events: tell, ask, and reply.
Tell
The piece of information conveyed by a tell act is assimilated into the beliefs of the receiver (according to the above denition of secure update). This is expressed by the following reaction rules: 
Ask
Since only agents with incomplete information will ask other agents, we may assume that the knowledge system of an asking agent is F, the system of relational factbases, or any conservative extension of it. Agents with knowledge systems such a s A , or SA, have complete information, i.e. for any if-query F, they believe either F or :F. Such agents will be asked for information by other agents, and they will reply to them, but they will never ask themselves. For practical reasons, each query is associated with an ID, called query handle. This ID is used to store queries in the system table query until the answers are received, or until they are timed out. Like i n K QML, we distinguish between
